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INTRODUCTION
Tracking objects as language unfolds
Imagine you are watching a cooking show. You can see the chef make lasagna
and you can also hear her describe what she is doing. As you are hearing “now we are
going to chop the onion”, you can actually see the chef locating the onion on her cutting
board, taking the knife from the knife stand and chopping the onion. You can see the
onion change from a round, ball-shaped object into a bunch of small white pieces. And
despite the dissimilarity between the initial and the end state of the onion (before and
after cutting), you still know that both the round object and the small white pieces can be
referred to as onion and, moreover, they are the same instance of an onion (we will refer
to such instances which are contextualized in space and time as tokens). In real life, after
the onion has been chopped, there is no way back – it can’t become intact. In language,
if you were to describe what the chef will do in the video to someone else, you would have
more flexibility in which state of the onion to direct your listener’s attention to. You could
say The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. in which case, upon
hearing the onion in the second sentence your listener would most probably think of a
chopped onion. However, you could also say The chef will chop the onion. But first, she
will smell the onion. – in this case, the second sentence refers to the intact onion. The
temporal connectives (And then vs But first) which differ between these two sentences
point to which state of the onion (intact or chopped) to incorporate into the mental
representation of the event described by the unfolding language which means that both
should be available in the course of discourse comprehension. How these
1

representations interact during sentence-level language comprehension is, broadly, the
question of the present study.
Some theories of language comprehension suggest that it relies on continuous
mapping of lexical items onto the meaning representations stored in our semantic
memory which eventually leads to the construction of situation models (Zwaan &
Radvansky, 1998) – mental representations of situations described by language. When
heard in isolation, individual words can elicit representations of generic objects stored in
our long-term semantic memory and associated with a given word. For example, the word
“onion” in isolation could elicit an aggregate mental image of a generic onion which lacks
any spatio-temporal details. However, we usually communicate with longer utterances
which create a context for the words they consist of, which leads to retrieval of more
specific representations. The representations we build in our mind during language
comprehension can be even more specific, for example in cases when language
describes events that unfold in real time in front of our eyes. As in the first example, if we
are watching a video of someone cooking we know very fine-grained details about the
objects which are being referred to by language. If we hear the chef describing how she
is going to cook the onion, we know the onion’s size (could be a small or an unusually
large onion), color (could be red or yellow), location (changes as the language unfolds:
first on the table, then on the cutting board, then on the frying pan), shape (perhaps not
ideally round), etc. And even though the objects described by the language are out there
in the real world, we are still building their mental representations which are dissociable
from the perceptually available counterparts. A study by Altmann and Kamide (2009) used
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eye-tracking and a visual world paradigm to explore the mapping between the language
describing what happens to displayed objects and internal representations of those
objects. Participants in the study saw static images depicting semi-realistic scenes and
heard sentences describing people in the scene act upon objects in the scene either
concurrently with scene presentation or following it. Critically, scenarios describing
location change (e.g. The woman will move the glass to the table) were compared to
scenarios which didn’t describe such change (e.g. The woman is too lazy to move the
glass to the table). Altmann and Kamide found that after having heard the sentences
describing location change, the participants were more likely to look at the new location
when the target object (the glass) was referenced again later in the discourse (She then
poured some wine into the glass) compared to the control sentences which didn’t describe
location change. Thus, this study demonstrated that people update their internal
representations of objects as dictated by language and such representations are
separable from the perceptually salient visual representations of objects.
In the Altmann & Kamide (2009) study, the glass changed state insofar as it
changed from one location to another. In the onion example above, the onion changes
intrinsic state, and these distinct states are associated with the same object. For example,
the sentence The chef will chop the onion introduces the onion and the details about it:
it’s the onion in the kitchen (and not in the garden or on the shelf in a store) and it is about
to undergo change (it will be chopped). The event of chopping entails changes in the state
of the onion and a single representation of an onion is not enough to understand that the
event took place, i.e. chopping inherently implies the transition of an onion from an intact
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to a chopped state. All these details about the onion, including featurally contrasting
representations of its initial and end states, now become a part of this particular onion’s
history. The unfolding language may selectively refer to either state of the onion, i.e. And
then/but first, she will smell the onion. How much of this onion’s history is retrieved at its
second mention? One possibility is that both representations of the onion are active at
this point, with each competing for selection – a competition which needs to be resolved
whenever the same object is referred to again. In this case, no matter what the temporal
term is in the subsequent sentence (And then or But first), the processing cost would be
higher than in scenarios which didn’t introduce the object in different states. Another
possibility is that we keep in our episodic memory only the most recent representation,
i.e. the chopped onion, in which case we would predict the increase of processing cost
only in the sentences which make one travel in time and retrieve the initial state as in But
first, she will smell the onion. Finally, the reference to the onion could in principle elicit the
prototypical representation of the onion (presumably, in its intact round shape), in which
case in sentences which refer to the resultant changed state (And then sentences), the
prototypical representation needs to be adjusted, which could also lead to increased
processing cost. To summarize, the first possibility predicts interference and competition
(and as a consequence, increase in processing cost associated with resolving it) between
state representations regardless of the intended state. The second possibility predicts
interference between the most recent state and the initial state only for the But first
scenarios, while the third possibility predicts interference between the prototypical object
and its changed state only for the And then scenarios.
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One way to explore these possibilities it to look into the brain and see whether
brain areas associated with competition during selection of alternative incompatible
interpretations would also be recruited for processing the object which underwent change,
and if so, in which scenarios (And then, But first or both?). One such brain area of interest
is left posterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (left pVLPFC) (for a discussion, see
Thompson-Schill, Bedny, & Goldberg 2005). Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, & Thompson-Schill
(2012) ran an fMRI study to look at whether left pVLPFC would be sensitive to the state
change manipulation, and if so, under which conditions. They found that indeed left
pVLPFC was more active as participants read sentences describing significant change
as compared to scenarios which entailed minimal or no change. Moreover, activation in
left pVLPFC correlated with the degree of change (rated in a separate on-line norming
study) suggesting that the more dissimilar the representations are, the more they
interfere. This interference took place regardless of whether the subsequent sentence
referred to the resultant (And then, …) or the initial (But first, …) states of the object,
suggesting that both are available and competing for selection given their mutual
exclusivity.
To further explore this object states competition effect and whether state
representations interfere only when they are bound to the same object token (and, as a
consequence, are mutually exclusive), Solomon, Hindy, Altmann, & Thompson-Schill
(2015) ran a study in which they had an additional manipulation of token reference (as
well as the original state change manipulation), i.e. half of their sentence pairs introduced
a new token in the second sentence (And then, she will smell another onion). The results
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showed that activation in left pVLPFC increased in response to substantial change
condition only when the second sentence referred back to the same object token and not
when it introduced a new object token. This result was interpreted as showing that only
representations that are mutually exclusive (such as different state representations of the
same object token) interfere with each other and compete for selection, while state
representations of distinct tokens don’t interfere. This finding is in line with the idea
(coming from studies of visual attention) that our cognitive system has a mechanism of
individuating and keeping track of object tokens independent of their visual properties,
i.e. two identical objects with the same perceptual properties can still be recognized and
maintained as two separate entities (Pylyshyn, 2001). Under the account of visual
indexing developed by Pylyshyn (2001), an individual token gets assigned a visual index
which makes it possible to keep track of this token over time and represent it as a single
entity despite changes in its location and visual properties. However, this line of research
doesn’t address the nature of representational content which is being tracked and neural
mechanisms by which such representations are built and maintained.
To summarize, experiments by Hindy et al (2012) and Solomon et al (2015)
suggest that our comprehension system keeps track of different instantiations of an object
which interfere with each other upon the object’s subsequent mentions and these
representations don’t interfere with the representations of newly introduced objects of the
same type. Localization of this effect, in pVLPFC which is known to be sensitive to conflict
resolution, suggests that the processing cost might be due to competition between
several incompatible representations of the same object. However, such competition is
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perhaps not a unitary process and may rely on multiple sub-processes such as selective
attention, suppression, updating of the current cognitive state, etc that get carried out in
response to the trigger stimulus, in our case, the token which has undergone change.
Due to the poor temporal resolution of fMRI, it is impossible to establish the dynamics of
these processes and where in the sentence they occur. Moreover, as these processes
unfold, they do so dynamically, meaning that at whichever point in the sentence we might
begin to see their unfolding, they may unfold not just across time (waxing and waning in
intensity, perhaps) but also across electrode space. EEG, unlike fMRI, provides greater
temporal resolution and could in principle allow us to inspect the dynamics of
representation retrieval under the magnifying glass.
EEG for studying cognition
EEG is a popular methodology in psycholinguistic research. Traditionally,
psycholinguistics has focused on event-related potentials (ERPs), which are computed
by averaging time-locked segments of the EEG signal across multiple trials. ERP is a
measure of purely evoked activity and a lot of information is lost during the averaging
across multiple trials. An alternative to ERP are time-frequency representations
(measures of intensity of different frequency components in the EEG signal), and these
could be a more sensitive measure because (i) they preserve induced activity which might
be different between our substantial and minimal change scenarios, (ii) this measure
includes the additional dimension of frequency and (iii) there is a rich literature relating
fluctuations of power at different frequencies over time to domain-general cognitive
processes such as memory encoding and retrieval, inhibition, attention, maintenance of
7

representations and their integration into the current context, etc. all of which could be
implicated in the process of retrieving representations of objects that have been in
multiple states.
Traditionally, frequencies in the EEG signal are organized into 5 bands: delta (1-3
Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), gamma (>30 Hz). Neural activity at
all these bands has been implicated in different cognitive processes across varying
paradigms and modalities, as well as having been found to be sensitive to syntactic and
semantic manipulations in sentence-level comprehension tasks. Below, we provide an
outline of functional processes associated with each frequency band with a specific focus
on brain oscillatory dynamics during sentence-processing. As we review theories of brain
oscillations and cognition, we discuss whether these theories could account for one or
more aspects of our findings on interfering object-states.
Neural oscillations and cognition
The time-frequency analysis of neural activity allows us to look at brain oscillations
over time. Increases in power at certain frequencies indicate synchronization of the
neural activity at that frequency, decreases in power indicate desynchronization. Terms
such as de/synchronization can be used to describe either long-range coordination
between different nodes of the same functional network or synchrony of neurons at a local
level (for discussion, see Bastiaansen & Hagoort, 2006). To examine the former, a
coherence analysis is necessary. Here we use time-frequency analysis to examine the
latter, i.e. local synchrony which occurs when large populations of neurons synchronize
their activity, and this signal becomes strong enough to propagate through the brain tissue
8

and skull and reach the electrodes. Whether the results of this analysis indicate that a
known physiological mechanism that produces the oscillation in the brain (such as
hippocampal theta rhythm, for example) is at play is a difficult question and perhaps only
in-vivo recordings of brain electrical activity can give a direct answer to it (for discussion,
see Cohen, 2014, pp.270-272). However, using indirect techniques such as M/EEG
across multiple paradigms and modalities to study the healthy human brain may bring us
closer to understanding the functional role of brain electrical dynamics at different
frequencies. The hope is that combining this knowledge with the evidence obtained using
in vivo techniques will ultimately help us discover the neurophysiological mechanisms
underlying brain function.
On the one hand, the EEG literature investigating the neural correlates of brain
function using the time-frequency analysis is huge. On the other hand, the phenomenon
we are particularly interested in – the dynamic building, maintaining and retrieving of
object-states representations – is part of a novel theory of event representation, itself
based on a novel phenomenon (Hindy et al., 2012, are the first to report it) and it would
be no exaggeration to say that until now there have been no EEG experiments which
have directly tested the predictions of this theory. Thus, we treat this study as exploratory.
However, we can draw some broad predictions from the literature on oscillations and
language comprehension broadly and sentence processing specifically (since in the
present study events were described by language), memory encoding and retrieval (since
discourse comprehension requires constant retrieving of representations from semantic
memory and their grounding in the episodic context of the discourse) as well as inhibition

9

and attention (since we believe that these processes could be differentially manipulated
by our state change and reference manipulations).
Beta and Gamma Oscillations
Using time-frequency analysis for studying the neural correlates of different
aspects of language comprehension doesn’t have a very long history; however, this
approach is gaining pace. Studies on sentence processing have mostly employed
syntactic violations (of gender and number agreement, word category, phrase structure,
verb tense) and semantic anomalies. There is an emerging pattern of results such that
syntactic violations elicit a decrease in beta power compared to correct sentences
(Bastiaansen, Magyari, & Hagoort, 2010; Davidson & Indefrey, 2007; Lewis, Lemhӧfer,
Schoffelen, & Schriefers, 2016; Kielar, Meltzer, Moreno, Alain, & Bialystok, 2014; Kielar,
Panamsky, Links, & Meltzer, 2015) while semantic anomalies lead to decrease in gamma
(Bastiaansen et al, 2010; Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2015; Vignali, Himmelstoss,
Hawelka, Richlan, & Hutzler, 2016; Penolazzi, Angrilli, & Job, 2009; Rommers, Dijkstra,
& Bastiaansen, 2013; Wang, Zhu, & Bastiaansen, 2012). Even though the experimental
stimuli in the present study don’t contain any violations, the predictive coding framework
developed by Lewis and Bastiaansen (2015) accounts for the above described findings
and generalizes the mechanisms involved for processing violations to sentence-level
meaning comprehension which makes these beta and gamma effects more relevant for
our question of interest. Lewis and Bastiaansen emphasize the hierarchical aspect of
information processing during language comprehension: higher-level representations of
meaning or structure are built as lower-level units are processed. Anticipation is an
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essential component of this workflow because in constraining contexts higher-level
representations are pre-activated ahead of the incoming lower-level information and topdown predictions are being propagated down the processing stream. According to the
predictive coding framework, a violation or anomaly serves as a cue to the language
comprehension system that the meaning or structure representation built so far is
problematic in some way and must be reconsidered. The framework accounts for the beta
effects described above by suggesting that beta activity is associated with the
maintenance of such sentence-level meaning representation under construction and
propagation of top-down predictions: beta power increases as the sentence unfolds and
decreases upon encountering a violation. Lower and middle gamma frequency (~30-60
Hz) reflects matching between top-down predictions and incoming linguistic input: gamma
is higher when the pre-activated representation matches the bottom-up input which is the
case of sentences which end with a very high cloze probability word, as demonstrated by
Wang et al, 2012. Higher gamma (>60 Hz) might be involved for lateral inhibition of
competing representations (for experimental evidence, see Nieuwland & Martin, 2017).
So what is the link between the above discussed findings and predictive coding
framework on the one hand and our object-state change manipulation on the other? We
believe that when the discourse describes an event that results in change of the object
state, representations of the object in its different states are being maintained throughout
discourse comprehension. Comparing scenarios which describe change (chop the onion)
to those which don’t (smell the onion) means that we are comparing two qualitatively (and
possibly quantitatively) different meaning representations, with that of the changed object
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being “richer” and having more details (because the end state of the object which
underwent substantial change differs from its initial state on one or more featural
dimensions and, under our account, both such feature sets are retained). Thus, beta
frequency which, according to Lewis and Bastiaansen, reflects maintenance of the
sentence-level meaning representation, might distinguish between two such sets of
representations, especially in scenarios which require our comprehension system to
switch from the current token to instantiate a new one (as in And then, she will weigh
another onion): switching from the intact onion to a new instance of an onion (presumably,
also intact) might be less problematic than switching from a “richer” representation. Under
the predictive coding account, we could also expect effects in low and middle gamma
because there might be differences in how likely the event in the second sentence to
follow substantial and minimal change events described in the first sentence.
High gamma could in principle also be relevant for the present study. Nieuwland
and Martin (2017) have reported the results of time-frequency analysis of 4 EEG studies
which all investigated oscillatory correlates of anaphoric reference. Results of these 4
studies which varied in modality (auditory/visual), language (Dutch, Spanish, English) and
type of referential expression (noun phrase/pronoun) showed increased gamma activity
for referentially coherent expressions compared with expressions that had either more
than one or no antecedents. The case of referential ambiguity where there is more than
one antecedent for the referential expression is similar to our case of multiple object states
where there is more than one state for the object which underwent change. Our minimal
change condition is similar to the case of referentially coherent expressions from
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Nieuwland and Martin, thus we might expect higher gamma in the minimal change
(referentially coherent) condition compared to the substantial change (referentially
problematic) condition. There is however a difference between the referential ambiguity
and state change cases: in the former, ambiguity is between different tokens, in the latter
is it between different states of the same token. Results of fMRI studies on referential
ambiguity and object-states competition effect don’t converge. As has been discussed
above, comprehending events which entail change leads to increased activation in LIFG
– an effect interpreted as indicating conflict between multiple competing representations
(Hindy et al, 2012; Solomon et al, 2015). Referential ambiguity did not elicit increases in
LIFG activation, but instead lead to increased activation in medial and bilateral parietal,
medial frontal and right superior frontal regions (Nieuwland et al, 2007) – brain areas
associated with problem-solving. The authors interpreted this effect as indicating that
selecting the correct antecedent relies not on resolving competition between several
potential referents, but instead on inference- and decision making for solving the problem.
If EEG and time-frequency analysis are sensitive to the same processes as fMRI, then
we shouldn’t expect the results of the present analysis to converge with those of
Nieuwland and Martin. However, it could be the case that gamma is sensitive to neither
problem solving nor conflict resolution, but instead to some cognitive processes shared
between processing referential ambiguity and comprehending change in which case we
might expect gamma effect.
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Theta Oscillations
Theta frequency has also been implicated in sentence processing and is
responsive to semantic manipulations, such as semantic anomalies (Davidson
& Indefrey, 2007; Bastiaansen and Hagoort, 2015; Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort, 2006;
Wang et al, 2012), open vs close-class words comparison (Bastiaansen et al., 2005),
comparison of words with visual vs auditory semantic properties (Bastiaansen,
Oostenveld, Jensen, & Hagoort, 2008), which suggests that theta activity might be
associated with lexical-semantic retrieval. Theta frequency has also been extensively
studied outside the sentence processing domain by memory researchers. For example,
theta has been implicated in episodic memory encoding and retrieval: theta differentiates
between items which will be later remembered during the encoding phase and between
old and new items during the retrieval phase (Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Schimke, & Ripper,
1997; Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Russegger, & Pachinger, 1996; Burgess & Gruzelier, 1997)
and increases with increased memory load (Jensen & Tesche, 2002), for a review, see
Klimesch, Schack, & Sauseng, 2005. In our paradigm, maintaining multiple or more
complex representations of an object in its different states might lead to higher memory
load and potentially induce increase in theta at retrieval in the state change condition
compared to the minimal change condition.
Alpha Oscillations
Finally, alpha is perhaps the most extensively studied frequency in the human
EEG. A well-known oscillatory signature of information processing is alpha suppression.
Since its discovery by Hans Berger in the late 1920s, it has been replicated many times.
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The basic finding is that alpha desynchronizes when the eyes are open compared to when
the eyes are closed. In language-related tasks, alpha desynchronization has been found
in response to semantic judgement tasks (Röhm, Klimesch, Haider, & Doppelmayr, 2001;
Klimesch, Doppelmayr, Pachinger, & Russegger, 1997) and syntactic violations
(Bastiaansen et al, 2010; Davidson & Indefrey, 2007; Kielar et al, 2014; Kielar et al, 2015).
But the general finding is that alpha desynchronizes for active information processing.
Somewhat paradoxically, in memory tasks involving retention of items, alpha power
increases proportionally to the number of items which need to be maintained in memory
(Jensen, Gelfand, Kounios, & Lisman, 2002; Tuladhar et al, 2007; Klimesch, Doppelmayr,
Schwaiger, Auinger, & Winkler, 1999). The gating by inhibition hypothesis (Jensen &
Mazaheri, 2010) as well as the inhibition-timing hypothesis (Klimesch, Sauseng, &
Hanslmayr, 2007) account for this paradox taking into account the timing and topography
of alpha effects. According to these two very similar theories, alpha increase indicates
inhibition of task-irrelevant brain areas or functional networks which facilitates information
processing in relevant areas/networks. If EEG will be sensitive to the effect found with
fMRI (object-states competition effect), we might expect effects in the alpha frequency
(because resolving competition requires inhibition of the irrelevant object-state).
There are also delta oscillations which are generated in sleep, but are also
modulated by the reward system and saliency of the target (Knyazev, 2007), but it is
difficult to relate these to the present study, and thus we are neither reviewing nor
including delta in the actual analysis.
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The present study
In the present study, we want to investigate how representations of objects in their
different states are built, maintained and retrieved as language unfolds, as well as how
our comprehension system switches from processing one token to instantiating a
representation of a different token of the same type. We manipulated the amount of
change an object undergoes (and, as a consequence, complexity of history associated
with the object), as well as the referent of the unfolding discourse (whether the same or
another token is being referred back to): The chef will weigh/chop the onion. And then,
she will smell the/another onion. We measured participants’ EEG while they read pairs of
sentences. Given that EEG power fluctuations in theta, alpha, beta and gamma
frequencies have been implicated in processes which could also be employed for tracking
objects through unfolding language, we expected oscillations at one or more of these
frequency bands to be sensitive to our manipulations.
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METHODS
Participants
Thirty-seven participants were recruited from the student population at the
University of Connecticut in accordance to the IRB approval. They received course credit
for their participation. Six participants were eliminated due to technical problems
(equipment and script failure). The remaining 31 participants (19 females; age range =
18-22 years) were native speakers of English, right-handed, had normal or corrected to
normal vision and hearing, and no history of neurological disorders. Data from several
more participants had to be discarded after preprocessing due to excessive EEG artifact
(details are provided below).
Materials and design
Each participant completed 320 trials. Experimental stimuli (N=160) were designed
to elicit the intersecting object-states effect and appeared in 4 conditions (40 sentences
per condition) in a 2 by 2 design (see Table 1 for the summary of conditions). All
experimental items consisted of two parts. In the first sentence, we manipulated the
degree of change the object underwent as a result of someone or something acting upon
it, e.g. The chef will weigh the onion (minimal change) or The chef will chop the onion
(substantial change). State change ratings were collected in a separate on-line norming
study (described below). The verbs were matched in length and frequency1. In the second
sentence, we manipulated the token reference, i.e. the sentence either referred back to

1

All frequency values were obtained using the SUBTL Word Frequency database (Brysbaert and New, 2009)).
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the previously introduced token (And then, she will smell the onion) or introduced a new
token of the same type (And then, she will smell another onion).
Filler sentences (N=160) were designed to potentially (i) elicit transient lexical and
referential ambiguity effects and (ii) reduce predictability of the object in the second
sentence. Lexical and referential ambiguity are of interest to us since they also arise in
cases when there is more than one representation bound to the lexical item, just like in
the case of objects which have undergone a significant change of state (and any further
reference to such objects could lead to transient ambiguity between different states). It
could be that processing the object which has been in two distinct states relies on the
same mechanisms as resolving lexical and/or referential ambiguity which would be
reflected in similar EEG patterns for all these types of ambiguity. However, there is one
major difference between lexical and referential ambiguity on the one hand and states
ambiguity on the other, with the latter being between two representations of the same
instance of an object token and the former – between representations of different objects.
Taking into account this difference as well as the fact that in our filler sentences the critical
entity is mentioned only once (and not later referred back to), processing a lexically or
referentially ambiguous entity would require an inference about which referent is more
likely given the context, whereas processing the critical entity from the main experimental
conditions would require retrieving that item’s history. Processing these different types of
ambiguities could rely on different mechanisms and engage different brain areas, and
thus result in different EEG patterns.
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As mentioned above, filler sentences also served the purpose of reducing
predictability of the object in the second sentence. Eighty filler sentences had the same
structure as experimental stimuli, however they introduced a new object type in the
second part (e.g. The woman will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the carpet). Half
of these stimuli (N=40) had a lexically ambiguous item in the second sentence (e.g. The
woman will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the runner). We manipulated the
context in order to bias the ambiguous items towards the less dominant meaning and thus
create transient competition between the dominant meaning and the contextually biased
subordinate meaning (meaning dominance was based on the norming studies by ElstonGuettler & Friederici, 2004; Gorfein, Viviani, & Leddo, 1982; Nelson, McEvoy, Walling, &
Wheeler, 1980; Titone, 1998). The sentences were designed this way in order to make
them elicit transient uncertainty rather than unresolved ambiguity because the former is
more similar to a conflict elicited by multiple states of an object. Nouns in the second
sentence were matched on length and frequency.
Finally, we also included 80 filler sentences with two clauses within a single
sentence. Half of them (N=40) were designed to elicit referential ambiguity, such as John
valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable, where he can refer to both John
and Edward. We used the implicit causality database provided by Ferstl et al (2010) to
choose the verbs which had a 70% bias either towards NP1 (N=20) or NP2 (N=20) to
make sure that the ambiguity is resolved. Again, such transient ambiguity is more similar
to the ambiguity arising from the competing objects states which is also transient and
resolved in favor of the state relevant in the context of the sentence. The rest of these
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filler sentences (N=40) were designed in such a way that the pronoun selectively pointed
to either actor or patient of the sentence (e.g. Daphne valued Edward because he was
very knowledgeable).
We didn’t run additional norming for the lexical and referential ambiguity
sentences; the results of the analyses performed on these sentences should therefore be
interpreted with caution.
Condition
Code
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

Condition

Example
Experimental sentences
Minimal Change, Same
The chef will smell the onion. And then, she
Object Token
will weigh the onion.
Substantial Change, Same The chef will chop the onion. And then, she
Object Token
will weigh the onion.
Minimal Change, Another
The chef will smell the onion. And then, she
Object Token
will weigh another onion.
Substantial Change,
The chef will chop the onion. And then, she
Another Object Token
will weigh another onion.
Filler sentences
Lexically Ambiguous
The woman will wash the floor. And then,
she will unroll the runner.
Lexically Unambiguous
The woman will wash the floor. And then,
(control for 5)
she will unroll the carpet.
Referentially Ambiguous
John valued Edward because he was very
knowledgeable.
Referentially Unambiguous Daphne valued Edward because he was
(control for 7)
very knowledgeable.

Table 1. Examples of the experimental and filler sentences for each condition.

To summarize, each subject was presented with 320 trials, split across 8
conditions (4 critical, 4 filler), with 40 items in each condition. All sentences were
counterbalanced across four experimental lists using a Latin square design and pseudorandomized so that there were no more than three consecutive trials from the same
condition.
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Change ratings
Change ratings for the actions described in the first sentence of each experimental
sentence pair were collected on-line using Qualtrics software. There were 160 sentence
pairs, yielding a total of 320 first sentences, evenly split between substantial and minimal
change conditions, resulting in 160 sentences per condition which were further split
across 4 stimuli lists, so that each participant saw only one version of each sentence (i.e.
describing either substantial or minimal change). Participants (N=159) were asked to rate
how much the object changes as a result of the action described on a scale from 1 (no
change) to 7 (big change). Sentences in the minimal change condition received an
average rating of 2.17 (sd = 0.86), sentences in the substantial change condition received
an average rating of 4.31 (sd = 0.97). Thus, there was a significant difference between
the average change ratings for the substantial and minimal change conditions (t = -19.9,
df=159, p<0.001). A post-hoc item analysis showed that there were 4 sentences with
reverse change ratings. They were removed from the analysis (thus instead of 160
experimental trials per person, there were 156 trials). The distribution of responses is
illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. State change ratings.

Plausibility ratings
Sentence pairs in the substantial and minimal change conditions differed only by
the verb (and, as a consequence, event) in the first sentences, while the second sentence
was kept constant across conditions. To see whether the event described in the second
sentences was equally likely to follow substantial or minimal change events, we collected
ratings (using Qualtrics software) for the likelihood that the second sentence of each
sentence pair would follow the first sentence. Items were split into 4 lists with an equal
amount of (randomized) substantial and minimal change items in each condition.
Participants (N~26) were asked to rate How likely is it that the event described in the
second sentence would follow the event described in the first sentence? on a scale from
1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely). For the same token reference, sentence pairs in the
minimal change condition received an average plausibility rating of 5.19 (sd = 0.93),
sentence pairs in the substantial change condition received an average plausibility rating
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of 4.93 (sd = 1.02). For another token reference, sentence pairs in the minimal change
condition received an average plausibility rating of 3.51 (sd = 0.77), sentence pairs in the
substantial change condition received an average plausibility rating of 3.63 (sd = 0.87).
Thus, events involving substantial change were rated as less likely to be followed by
events described in the second sentence than events involving minimal change
(p=0.0004 for the same and p=0.03 for another token reference). We return to this issue
in the Results and Discussion sections.
Procedure
Before the experiment, participants were asked to read and sign a consent form
and fill out the demographic information forms. Together with the subject preparation (see
EEG Data Acquisition section) this part took approximately 30 minutes.
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated chamber. Participants were
asked to read sentences and answer comprehension questions, while trying to minimize
movements and blinks during sentence presentation. The experiment started with 10
practice trials, followed by 320 experimental and filler items, split into 8 blocks. Sentences
were presented on a Dell monitor using PsychoPy software (Pierce, 2007). Subjects were
seated 80 cm away from the screen. Each trial started with a black fixation box presented
for 1300 msec on a grey background, in the center of the screen. Sentences were then
presented one word at a time with words presented in a yellow font inside the fixation box
at a fixed rate. Each word was presented for 300 msec, followed by an interstimulus
interval (ISI) of 300 msec. After the last word of the sentence disappeared from the
screen, the blank fixation box remained on the screen for 1000 msec. 12% of trials were
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followed by yes/no comprehension questions (N=39). Participants were instructed to
press the “f” and “j” keys on a keyboard to give their responses and to use the “j” key to
proceed to another sentence whenever they felt ready. After every block, they were given
feedback about their progress (i.e. how many sentences were read, how many were left,
how many comprehension questions were answered correctly). Accuracy for the
comprehension questions was used as an indication that participants read the sentences
carefully. On average, performance accuracy was 94%. The time on task was
approximately 1 hour 20 minutes.
EEG data acquisition
EEG was recorded using a 256-channel HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Net at a
sampling rate of 1000 Hz. The data were amplified using a Net Amps 400 Amplifier
(Electrical Geodesics, Inc., Eugene, OR). Recordings were referenced on-line to Cz and
re-referenced off-line to the average of all channels. There were no on-line filters.
Impedances were set below 50 kO.
Data preprocessing
Preprocessing and analyses were performed using the Fieldtrip toolbox for Matlab
(Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). A high-pass filter at 0.1 Hz and a lowpass filter at 55 Hz were applied to the continuous data. Then, epochs ranging from 1750
msec before and 2200 msec after the critical word (see below) onset were extracted with
a 30 msec offset (because additional testing showed that our stimuli appeared on the
screen with a ~30 msec delay). Even though the final analysis was performed on shorter
epochs, preprocessing was done on longer time-windows to provide sufficient data
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padding for the subsequent time-frequency analysis. In the experimental conditions,
preprocessing was time-locked to the noun phrase in the second sentence, e.g. And then,
she will weigh the/another onion (however, noun phrases were later split into separate
determiner and noun trials for the final analysis, see below for more details). In the lexical
ambiguity condition, the critical word was the last noun in the second sentence, e.g. And
then, unroll the carpet/runner. In the referential ambiguity condition, the critical word was
the pronoun, e.g. John valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable.
To maximize reproducibility, we tried to use automatic approaches for data
preprocessing whenever it was possible. After segmentation, the data were demeaned
and resampled at 500 Hz. Next, bad channels were automatically identified (channels
were classified as contaminated if their variance exceeded a z threshold of 1). Such
channels were removed from the data and interpolated using spline interpolation. The
average number of removed channels per person was 9.7 (~4%), however it varied
substantially among individuals (sd = 7.7). Next, a principal components analysis reduced
the dimensionality of our data to 60 components, on which an independent components
analysis was performed. Blinks, eye-movements and the remaining line noise
components were identified manually (this was the only subjective step in the entire
routine) and removed from the data. On average, 3.1 components were removed per
participant (sd = 1.4). Finally, the data were re-referenced to the average of all channels
(and Cz channel was recovered through this procedure, which resulted in a total of 257
channels). Ideally, reference sites shouldn’t pick up brain activity. In reality, this is not the
case and even electrodes at the mastoids or earlobes (which often serve as a reference)
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can pick up activity from the temporal lobe or muscle-related artifacts (for more details,
see the discussion of the no-Switzerland principle by Luck (2014), pp.151-165).
Moreover, in high-density systems such as ours if we were to choose mastoid channels
as a reference, some recording sites would be too close to the reference channels and
activity recorded at such sites would be similar to those of the reference channels. On the
other hand, given that “the integral of negative and positive potential fields in a conducting
sphere sums to exactly zero” (Dien, 1998, p. 35), we used average reference to take
advantage of the fact that 256 channels allow for decent sampling of the head surface
potential and thus could be used as an approximation of a true zero.
The remaining preprocessing steps (i.e. de-trending and threshold-based artifact
rejection) were performed for experimental and filler items separately (because length of
the segments of interest varied for experimental and filler trials). Below are the details of
the remaining preprocessing steps and analysis parameters for the experimental trials.
Further information about the preprocessing and analysis of the filler items, as well as the
discussion of results is provided in Appendix C.
Choice of the critical word and baseline period
One aim of the present study was to investigate the dynamics of the interaction
between multiple representations of the same object. Our region of interest, therefore, is
the end of the second sentence of each sentence pair, where the object which was
introduced in the first sentence is referred back to again. However, since (i) we used
RSVP paradigm and presented strictly one word at a time (so a determiner and a noun
were presented separately) and (ii) given the fact that the noun from the first sentence
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was repeated in the second sentence on most trials2 (e.g. The chef will smell the onion.
And then, she will weigh the onion.), we assumed that participants would anticipate the
ending of the sentence and any potential effects could emerge even before presentation
of the final noun, i.e. at the determiner (c.f. the anticipatory processes observed by
Altmann & Kamide, 1999; DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005). For this reason, we split each
trial, time-locked to the determiner and lasting until the offset of the final noun, into
separate determiner and noun epochs for further preprocessing and analysis.
Since we are interested in the effect of retrieval of a target representation (and
potential conflict due to multiple competing representations of the object in its different
states), we chose the verb before the final noun as our baseline. This ensures that any
differential activation in response to the critical words (i.e. determiner and noun) in the
substantial and minimal change conditions is due to the retrieval and not maintenance of
object’s multiple states.
Trials time-locked to the determiner
We redefined experimental trials to include 850 msec before and 860 msec after
the determiner onset which would allow us to look at the power spectrum associated with
the determiner in the time-window of 600 msec before and 600 msec after the determiner
(given the parameters of the time-frequency analysis, see below). After removing the
linear trend from the trials and running automatic artifact rejection, we eliminated

3

25% of trials – these were filler items designed to elicit referential ambiguity and their controls – consisted of one sentence
and all had the same sentential pattern, e.g. <John valued Edward> because s/he <was very knowledgeable>, where the agent and
the patient were always proper names. 75% of trials had the following structure: The <agent> will <perform an action on the object>.
And then, s/he will <perform another action on the/another object> of which two thirds had a repeating noun. If we believe that
participants were sensitive to this distribution of items (for example, a proper name could serve as a cue that the trial will consist of
one sentence) and anticipated repetition of the noun on only two-sentence trials, then we could expect participants to have an even
stronger expectation that the noun will be repeated (since it was true for ~66% of two-sentence pairs) which could lead to early effects
.
at the determiner
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participants (N=8) who had more than 50% of trials with activity exceeding the +/-100 mV
threshold. Approximately 16% of trials were removed from the data of the 23 participants
who entered the final analysis. The remaining trials were equally distributed among
conditions (Minimal Change, Same Object Reference = 33, Substantial Change, Same
Object Reference = 33, Minimal Change, Another Object Reference = 33, Minimal
Change, Another Object Reference = 33).
Trials time-locked to the noun
To compute power on the noun relative to the verb, we extracted 850 msec before
the determiner (verb-associated activity) and concatenated these epochs with the 860
msec following the noun onset. We further ran de-trending and automatic artifact rejection
(using the +/-100 mV threshold) on such concatenated trials. 8 participants who had less
than 50% of remaining trials were eliminated. Approximately 19% of trials were removed
from the data of the 23 participants who entered the final analysis. The remaining trials
were equally distributed among conditions (Minimal Change, Same Object Reference =
31, Substantial Change, Same Object Reference = 31, Minimal Change, Another Object
Reference = 31, Minimal Change, Another Object Reference = 32).
Time-frequency analysis
To calculate power spectrum in the 4-30 Hz frequency range, a 500 msec long
time-window and a Hanning taper were used. Power changes were computed in steps of
10 msec and 2 Hz. To calculate power spectrum in the 30-55 Hz frequency range, a 200
msec long time-window and a Hanning taper were used. Power changes were computed
in steps of 10 msec and 5 Hz. Then, time-frequency representations were averaged for
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each subject, separately for each of the four experimental conditions. Post critical-word
subject averages were expressed as a relative change from the baseline interval of 600
to 250 msec before the critical word (which corresponds to verb presentation and 50 msec
of blank screen following it). A cluster-based random permutation test was used to
compare the contrasts of interest.
Statistical analysis
A cluster-based random permutation approach (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007) was
used to compare the neural response between conditions. Since this approach only
allows for pairwise comparisons, the following contrasts were considered and are
reported (separately for the determiner and noun trials):
•
•

Same object token
o Minimal Change vs Substantial Change
Another object token
o Minimal Change vs Substantial Change
Data points in the 0 to 600 msec time-windows relative to the critical word

(determiner and noun) onset were entered into the final analysis. For all conditions, data
from all 257 EEG channels were included in the analysis. Separate analyses were
performed for each of the four frequency bands: theta (4-7 Hz), alpha (8-12 Hz), beta (1330 Hz) and gamma (30-55 Hz). For every time-frequency-channel data point a dependent
samples two-tailed t-test was performed to compare activation between conditions. All
data points which met a significance level of p=0.025 per tail were clustered based on
temporal adjacency, and a cluster-level statistic was calculated by adding together all tvalues within a cluster. Next, the condition labels were swapped and a t-test was run for
such permuted samples. This procedure was repeated 1000 times and a histogram was
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created based on the resulting t-values. If the cluster-level statistic fell within highest or
lowest 2.5th percentile of the permutation histogram, the effect was said to be significant.
RESULTS
See Table 2 for the summary of results for the determiner and noun trials. See
Appendix C for the summary of results for the filler trials.
Power changes time-locked to the determiner
For the same token reference, the cluster-based random permutation test revealed
a significant difference (p=0.01) between the substantial and minimal change conditions
in one of the three tested frequency bands, namely in alpha3 (8-12 Hz): there was more
alpha power in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change condition.
The difference was most pronounced between 80 and 510 msec after the determiner
onset and had a left temporal distribution (see Figure 2). Testing in the theta (4-7 Hz),
beta (13-30 Hz) and gamma (30-55 Hz) frequency bands didn’t yield significant results.
For another token reference, the cluster-based random permutation test didn’t
reveal significant differences between the substantial and minimal change conditions in
any of the frequency bands. However, testing in the beta frequency band (13-30 Hz)
revealed a marginally significant difference (p=0.07). In Figure 3 which visualizes the
results for another token reference, we chose to plot topographies averaged across the
same time (80-510 msec) and frequency (8-12 Hz) windows in which the difference

3

To make sure that this alpha effect is not due to the differences in plausibility of the second sentence following the first
sentence between the substantial and minimal change conditions (for more details, see Methods section), we removed 19 items with
the largest differences in plausibility ratings between the conditions so that the average difference wasn’t significant anymore,
recomputed time-frequency representations and re-ran statistics on this new reduced dataset. The alpha effect persisted.
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between the two change conditions (substantial and minimal) was significant for the same
token reference to allow for comparison of alpha dynamics between the two reference
conditions (same and another).
Determiner

0-600 msec
SubSame-MinSame

SubAnother-MinAnother

theta (4-7Hz)

0.8 (neg)

0.62 (pos)

alpha (8-12Hz)

0.01 (pos)

0.43 (pos)

beta (13-30Hz)

0.39 (pos)

0.07 (neg)

gamma (30-55Hz)

1 (neg and pos)

0.93 (neg)

Noun

0-600 msec
SubSame-MinSame

SubAnother-MinAnother

theta (4-7Hz)

0.9 (neg)

0.54 (pos)

alpha (8-12Hz)

0.67 (neg)

0.41 (neg)

beta (13-30Hz)

0.62 (pos)

0.3 (neg)

gamma (30-55Hz)

0.63 (pos)

0.52 (pos)

Table 2. Results of the cluster-based random permutation tests for the substantial vs minimal change
contrast, reported are the smallest p-values.

Power changes time-locked to the noun
Cluster-based random permutation test didn’t reveal any significant differences for
any of the contrasts on the trials time-locked to the noun. For visualization (Figure 4), we
chose to plot the dynamics of alpha power differences between substantial and minimal
change conditions for both the same and another token reference because it was the only
significant effect found on the determiner trials. The pattern of alpha dynamics for both
reference conditions is qualitatively similar to that of the respective determiner trials;
however, as has been mentioned already and is reported in Table 2, none of the
comparisons on the noun trials yielded significant differences.
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Power changes time-locked to the determiner: same token reference

Figure 2. Time-frequency representations for
the (A) substantial and (B) minimal change
conditions, as well as (C) the difference
between the substantial and minimal change
conditions for the same token reference. The
data used for these graphs are an average of
four representative channels (E69, E70, E74,
E75) highlighted in (D) – the difference
topography between the substantial and
minimal change conditions averaged in the 812 Hz frequency and 80-510 msec time
windows. (E) The dynamics of alpha (8-12
Hz) power changes. The color bars represent
relative power change compared to the
baseline period spanning from -600 to -250
msec before the determiner onset.
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Power changes time-locked to the determiner: another token reference

Figure 3. Time-frequency representations for the (A)
substantial and (B) minimal change conditions, as well
as (C) the difference between the substantial and
minimal change conditions for another token
reference. The data used for these graphs are an
average of four representative channels (E69, E70,
E74, E75) highlighted in (D). Topographies in (D) and
(E) are averaged for the alpha frequency band (8-12
Hz) to highlight the absense of effect found for the
same token reference. The color bars represent
relative power change compared to the baseline period
spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the
determiner onset.
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Power changes time-locked to the noun

Figure 4. The dynamics of alpha (8-12 Hz) power changes. The color bar represents relative power change
compared to the baseline ([-600 -250] msec). The difference in activation between the substantial and
minimal change conditions wasn’t significant.
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DISCUSSION
In the present EEG study, we used neural oscillations to study how objects
introduced into the discourse are tracked during sentence processing. We believe that as
we comprehend language, these representations are retrieved from semantic memory,
contextualized in the discourse, and maintained in short-term and episodic memory
systems as language unfolds. We manipulated how many representations were
associated with the same token: some scenarios described events which led to significant
changes in the state of the object, thus more than one representation was now associated
with the introduced token (before and after change); while other scenarios described
events which didn’t result in object’s state change, thus one representation was sufficient.
We also manipulated whether the same token or another token of the same type was
later referred to in the discourse. This allowed us to compare the neural signatures of
representing the same object token in its different states (the same onion before and after
chopping) and several tokens of the same type in different states (e.g. one chopped and
one intact onion) as well as to address the question whether simply having multiple state
representations could lead to more effortful processing of the discourse or whether it is
specifically retrieving the history of the same token and its multiple representations which
increases the processing effort.
A time-frequency analysis of EEG, synchronized from the onset of the final
determiner in the second sentence, revealed a significant increase in alpha power (8-12
Hz) in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change condition when the
sentence referred back to the same object token, but not when the sentence referred to
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a different instance of an object (see Figures 2 and 3). How can the fact that we didn’t
find alpha effect for another token reference help us interpret the findings of the present
study? Conceptually, there is one major difference between processing that happens as
one reads the final noun phrase which either refers back to the already mentioned item
or introduces a new item of the same type. To illustrate this difference, let’s get back to
the examples used in the Introduction,
1. The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will weigh the onion.
2. The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will weigh another onion.
In (1), processing the event of chopping the onion in the first sentence requires
thinking about the onion before and after change, thus representations of the onion in
both states are available. However, any further reference to this instance of an onion
requires selection of one of these representations (given the context in (1), it should be
the chopped onion) since they are mutually exclusive – the object can’t be in two different
states simultaneously, unless we are talking about Schroedinger’s cat. Such clash of
representations leads to competition, as demonstrated by increased activation in VLPFC
in substantial compared to minimal change condition (Hindy et al, 2012; Solomon et al,
2015). In (2), representations of the initial and end states of the onion are also required
to process the event of chopping, however the state of another onion introduced in the
second sentence does not interfere with either of the states of the “old” onion, because
their representations are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, thus no competition is
elicited (as also demonstrated in Solomon et al (2015) – Stroop-sensitive voxels weren’t
differentially activated in substantial and minimal change conditions whenever the second
sentence introduced a new item). While fMRI studies mentioned above looked at the
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Stroop-sensitive voxels and interpreted the difference between substantial and minimal
change conditions in terms of competition between object-states, we can try to
decompose the notion of competition into inhibition and selection components and
interpret our EEG alpha effect as indicating inhibition of the irrelevant token state which
is required for selecting the relevant one.
Since the initial discovery of alpha rhythms in the human EEG in 1920s and for a
long time since then, increases in alpha have been associated with cortical idling, while
alpha decreases were believed to support active information processing. However, since
the more recent studies on memory load and retention found that alpha power increases
proportionally to the amount of items that need to be retained in memory (e.g. Jensen et
al., 2002; Tuladhar et al., 2007), the role of alpha oscillations for cognition has been
reconsidered. While Jensen et al (2002) and Tuladhar et al (2007) studies examined
alpha during the retention period, the study by Waldhauser, Johansson, & Hanslmayr,
2012 investigated oscillatory signatures of retrieval of competing visual memories, which
is more directly relatable to the present study. Participants in their study were presented
with abstract line drawings (cues) associated with rectangles of different colors (targets)
presented to the right and left visual fields (RVF and LVF, respectively). Half of the shapes
were paired with rectangles of the same color (non-interference condition), another half
were paired with rectangles of different colors (interference condition). During the
selective retrieval test phase the participants were presented with a cue and a white
rectangular either in RVF or LVF and asked to covertly retrieve (imagine) the color of the
box associated with that cue and visual field. EEG recorded during the selective retrieval
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test was analyzed in the time-frequency domain and showed that there was an increase
in alpha/beta power in the interference condition compared to the non-interference
condition. When targets associated with the cue drawing were of the same color (noninterference condition), no such alpha/beta increase was observed. We believe that our
object-states interference effect is similar in nature to this effect of interfering visual
memories. A token which underwent a change of state has (at least) two distinct
representations (and as a consequence, two distinct features sets associated with them)
now bound to it, just like in the Waldhauser et al study, a cue in the interference condition
is also associated with two representations differing on the color dimension. However, the
study by Waldhauser et al had this additional visual field manipulation since they were
interested in the lateralization of the effect. And indeed, the alpha/beta increase was
found over the hemisphere associated with the competitor, and not the target item. They
explain this finding in terms of the inhibition gating hypothesis formalized by Jensen and
Mazaheri in their 2010 paper. According to this theory, information is gated by inhibiting
the task-irrelevant areas of the brain, and this inhibition is implemented via alpha
oscillations. For example, studies of spatial attention found increases in alpha over the
hemisphere ipsilateral to the hemifield to which attention was directed (e.g. Thut, Nietzel,
Brandt, & Pascual-Leone, 2006; Händel, Haarmeier, & Jensen, 2010). Taken together,
these findings suggest that alpha is important for inhibition (of either competing memories
or task-irrelevant regions), and this suppression of irrelevant information or brain areas
facilitates processing of relevant information. If we reiterate this statement in the context
of our study, suppression of irrelevant object-state facilitates activation of the relevant
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one. However, the topography of our effect – which spans left fronto-temporal electrodes,
right above VLPFC – doesn’t straightforwardly fit under the gating inhibition hypothesis if
we believe that the alpha effect is reflective of the VLPFC effect reported in Hindy et al
(2012) and Solomon et al (2015). Under Hindy and Solomon account, VLPFC is activated
to a higher extent for processing competing object-states. Under the gating inhibition
account, areas generating synchronized alpha oscillations are the ones which need to be
inhibited for processing the critical information. If for a moment we assume that sensorspace is representative of the underlying brain space and that the alpha increase that we
observe in the present study indeed has its sources in the left inferior frontal areas (based
on the topography of the effect), then according to the gating inhibition hypothesis, these
areas are inhibited to facilitate processing in other areas which might be more critical for
our manipulation. It could be that our effect is not reflective of the VLPFC effect reported
in earlier fMRI studies and thus this explanation would totally be possible. Or it could also
be that our assumption that the observed topography reflects activation in VLPFC is
wrong, which could very well be the case because (i) sensor space doesn’t map directly
onto brain space and (ii) we didn’t run any additional analyses to localize out effect. To
summarize the discussion we had so far, interference between multiple object-states
should logically lead to inhibition of the irrelevant state, and alpha synchronization we
observe in the substantial change condition might signal such inhibition given the previous
findings connecting alpha and inhibition. Additional analyses are required to make a
stronger connection between the EEG and fMRI findings.
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We also found a marginally significant (p=0.07) decrease in beta (13-30 Hz) power
at the determiner in the substantial change condition relative to the minimal change
condition when the discourse introduced a new object token in the second sentence. As
discussed in the introduction, beta activity is associated with maintenance of sentencelevel meaning representation under construction and propagation of top-down predictions
(Lewis and Bastiaansen, 2015): beta power increases as the sentence unfolds and
decreases upon encountering a violation or any other cue signaling that the structure built
so far must be reconsidered. Introducing a new token of the same type (as is the case of
another token reference condition) could serve as such a cue to the comprehension
system that the meaning built so far must be revised and the focus should be switched to
the new token. Revising the meaning in the substantial change condition is perhaps more
effortful simply because the representation of the event there has more detail than in the
minimal change condition, and this fact could be reflected in decrease in beta in the
substantial compared to minimal change condition. However, since this effect is marginal,
we are not further discussing it here.
Analysis of filler items designed to elicit referential and lexical ambiguity didn’t yield
any significant results (for the summary of results, see Appendix C). The pattern of
activation associated with referentially and lexically ambiguous items didn’t resemble that
associated with the object change manipulation. Thus, the results of the statistical
analysis and visual inspection of the filler items suggest that interference resulting from
multiple competing object-states representations is not the same as the interference
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between multiple interfering antecedents for the pronoun or multiple meanings for the
lexically ambiguous items.
While spatial resolution is not what people usually look for when using EEG,
temporal resolution definitely is. Any assumptions about the timing of the fMRI effect
reported by Hindy et al and Solomon et al was possible only because of comparing across
several experiments. Using EEG in the present study allowed us to time-lock to the
window of interest, specifically the last noun phrase in the second sentence, to directly
test what happens at the retrieval. We found an effect at the determiner and no effect at
the noun. We believe that this happened because of the nature of our stimuli set, where
in 50% of all trials the noun in the second sentence was the same as in the first sentence
(e.g. The chef will smell the onion. And then, she will weigh the onion.), which made it
very easy for the participants to anticipate the ending of sentence pairs. Thus, the cloze
probability of sentence endings was really high, not because of semantically restricting
context of the sentence itself, but because of the frequent pattern in our stimuli. Under
such conditions effect at the determiner is not surprising. And, in fact, there are studies
(e.g. DeLong et al, 2005) demonstrating ERP effects at the articles preceding the critical
words in contexts with high cloze probability of the final word.
EEG (unlike fMRI) also allows for exploration of the dynamics of the state-change
effect. Figure 2E shows the dynamics of alpha power changes for the substantial vs
minimal change contrast for the same token reference. We can see that the differences
emerge first rather focally separately over the left and right hemispheres around 100 msec
after the determiner onset; at around 300 msec they are distributed almost over the entire
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scalp and at around 500 msec they are most pronounced over the left hemisphere. So
far we’ve discussed only the effect over the left fronto-temporal channels because this is
the area in the sensor space where the effect is most pronounced and it is over the
regions that fMRI studies by Hindy et al (2012) and Solomon et al (2015) showed are
involved in the resolution of the conflict between two representations of the same token.
As was discussed earlier, this effect in the sensor space might (or might not) be
representative of the VLPFC competition effect seen in earlier fMRI studies. How about
the rest of the dynamics? Research on semantic memory (Barsalou, 1999) suggests that
conceptual representations (of objects) are distributed across brain areas recruited for
processing sensory and motor information associated with those concepts (e.g. internal
representations of the onion include representations of its smell, shape, motoric
affordances, etc). Moreover, such representations are dynamic and change as a function
of our personal previous experiences with the object as well as the more recent and
immediate context we encounter the object in (for a review, see Yee, 2017). Information
about certain features of the object might become available earlier because the context
highlights/primes those features, e.g. being a participant in an eye-tracking study which
uses a visual world paradigm might make visual features (such as shape) more salient
than non-visual features (such as function). It doesn’t mean that function information is
not accessible, it just means that it becomes available later in the course of object
recognition (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). In our study, we modulated the
context in which the target word appeared such that some contexts described events that
lead to a change of state while others didn’t. Actions which lead to a change of state such
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as chop, crack, mash, etc change not only how the object looks before and after change
(e.g. imagine an intact and a chopped onion), but also, for example, its motoric
affordances: think about how picking up an intact and a chopped onion would require
different grasps or even actions. Or in our example of a chef acting upon an onion,
chopping an onion highlights the smell feature more so than weighing it. Actions which
don’t lead to a change of state, such as smell, inspect, weigh are more likely to focus our
attention only on a single generic feature set of that object (as distinct from the multiple
feature sets associated with the dynamics of the object’s changes in state). Even though
we didn’t run any quantitative analysis to control for the number of dimensions on which
the object changes (and thus, potentially, the number and type of features the context
highlights), our intuition is that grounding the object in the context which describes a
significant change of state systematically highlights more features than the minimal
change context. This systematic difference might have an effect on the time-course and
topography of EEG associated with the object recognition in the substantial and minimal
change conditions: as features of the multiple state representations attempt to activate,
features associated with the context-irrelevant state representation need to be inhibited
which is reflected in the alpha dynamics.
To summarize, our study demonstrated the dynamics of neural response
associated with a retrieval of a conceptual representation during sentence processing –
a dynamic which couldn’t be detected in fMRI studies on which the present study is based.
Future work will further examine such dynamics and ask more specific questions about
its timing and neural sources. Specifically, the immediate follow-up analyses to this work
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will look earlier in the sentence pair to examine the dynamics of neural response
associated with building representations of objects when they are first introduced into the
discourse and with their maintenance as discourse unfolds.
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. Summary of studies on theta, alpha, beta and gamma oscillations related to sentence processing
and memory encoding and retrieval.
Study

Paradigm

Theta

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

x

x

x

x

Decrease
upon
violation

Sentence processing: syntax
Bastiaansen,
Van Berkum,
Hagoort,
2002a

Gender and
number agreement violation

Increase in
response to
violations

Bastiaansen,
Van Berkum,
Hagoort,
2002b

Sentence reading
(RSVP)

Gradual
increase as the
sentence
unfolded;
increase in
response to
word onset
(compared to
the blank screen
reference
interval)

Lower alpha increase in
response to
word onset
(compared to
the blank
screen
reference
interval); in
lower-2 alpha
and upper
alpha, a
widespread
power decrease

Bastiaansen,
Magyari, &
Hagoort,
2010

Word category
violation

Linear increase
in correct
sentences

Decrease
upon violation

Decrease upon
violation

Meyer,
Obleser, &
Friederici,
2013

Short vs long
argument –verb
distances
(tapping into the
working memory
load during
sentence
processing)
Gender and
number
agreement
violation

x

Increase during
retention

Increase during
retrieval (upon
the verb)

Increase upon
violation

x

Lewis,
Lemhӧfer,Sc
hoffelen, &
Schriefers,20
16

x

Decrease upon
violation

x

x

50

Study

Paradigm

Theta

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Sentence processing: semantic and syntactic manipulations
Davidson
& Indefrey,
2007

Kielar,
Meltzer,
Moreno,
Alain, &
Bialystok,
2014
Kielar,
Panamsky,
Links, &
Meltzer, 2015

Bastiaansen
and Hagoort,
2015

Vignali,
Himmelstoss,
Hawelka,
Richlan, &
Hutzler, 2016
Bastiaansen,
Linden,
Keurs,
Dijkstra, &
Hagoort 2005

Phrase
structure
and number
agreement
violation,
semantic
anomaly
Verb tense
violation,
semantic
anomaly

Increase in
theta upon
semantic
violations

Semantic
anomaly,
syntactic
anomaly

Increase (15Hz) upon both
types of
violations

Correct
sentences (1),
semantic (2)
and syntactic
(3) violations,
syntactically
correctsemantically
meaningless
(4), words in
random order
(5)
Semantic
anomaly,
Random word
order

Increase upon
semantic
violation

Open and
close class
words
compared to
the blank
screen
reference
interval

Increase in
response to
both class of
words, however
only open class
words elicited
theta increase
over left
temporal
electrodes

x

Higher for
structured
sentences
(compared to
random order)

Decrease upon
violation

Decrease
upon violation

x

Decrease upon
violation

Decrease
upon violation

x

Decrease upon
violation (different
topography for
different
manipulations)

Decrease
upon violation
(different
topography for
different
manipulations)
Higher for 1
and 4 than for
5 throughout
the entire
sentence

x

x

Decrease in
response to words
(as compared to
fixation baseline)

Decrease
upon
anomalous
words

Decrease in
response to
words (as
compared to
fixation
baseline)

x

Higher for 1
than for 4
and 5
throughout
the entire
sentence

Increase in
structured
sentences
(compared
to random
order)
x
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Study

Paradigm

Theta

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Sentence processing: semantics
Rommers,
Dijkstra, &
Bastiaansen,
2013

Literal and
idiomatic
contexts, within
each they had
correct,
incorrectrelated-in
meaning and
incorrectunrelated
conditions

Wang, Zhu, &
Bastiaansen,
2012

High cloze, low
cloze, semantic
violation

Wang et al,
2012

Congruent and
incongruent
sentence
endings

Peña and
Melloni (2012)

Spoken
sentence
comprehension
in native and
non-native
languages

Mante S.
Nieuwland
and Andrea E.
Martin, 2017

Referential
ambiguity (4
different
studies)

Hald,
Bastiaansen,
& Hagoort,
2006

Semantic
violation

x

x

x

Increase upon
semantic
violation

x

x

Decrease for
incongruent
over the left
hemisphere

Decrease over
the left
hemisphere
(correlated
with the N400)

x

x

x

x

x

x

Increase upon
violation

x

x

x

Increase in
response to the
more
semantically
informative
word, but only
within the literal
context; lower
in correct
idioms than in
correct
literal
sentences
Increase in the
high cloze
condition, but
not in the low
cloze and
violation
conditions
x

Gamma
differentiates
between native
and non-native
languages
(semantic
integration)
Increase in
gamma in
response to
referentially
coherent
expressions
compared to
referentially
problematic
Decrease upon
violation
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Study

Paradigm

Theta

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Penolazzi,
Angrilli, & Job,
2009

Semantic
violation (verb
selectional
restrictions
violated)
Reading,
reading +
semantic task
(finding a
superordinate
category for the
target word)
Individual
words (with
auditory or
visual semantic
properties)

x

x

x

Lower upon
violations

Theta power
equal between
conditions
(conclusion:
working
memory)

Less alpha in
the semantic
task
(conclusion:
semantic
processing)

x

x

Increase to
words (as
compared to
reference blank
interval);
topographic
doubledissociation for
aud and vis
words
x

An early
increase and
subsequent
decrease

Increase to
words (as
compared to
reference
blank interval)

x

Coherence
patterns
identical for
both abstract
and concrete
nouns

Beta
coherence
difference
between
abstract and
concrete
nouns
x

x

Röhm,
Klimesch,
Haider, &
Doppelmayr,2
001

Bastiaansen,
Jensen,
Hagoort, 2008

Weiss,
Rappelsberge
r, 1996

Abstract and
concrete nouns

Weiss et al,
2000

Memory
encoding and
retrieval of
abstract and
concrete nouns

Higher
coherence
during the
encoding of
later recalled
nouns;
concrete nouns
showed higher
short-range
coherence;
abstract nouns
correlated with
higher longrange
coherence.

x

x
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Study

Paradigm

Theta

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Memory: semantic association and episodic recognition tasks
Klimesch,
Schimke, &
Schwaiger,
1994

Klimesch,
Doppelmayr,
Pachinger, &
Russegger,
1997

Klimesch,
Doppelmayr,
Schimke,
Ripper, 1997

Conceptfeature pairs: 1.
Semantic task
– are the
features
congruent with
the concept; 2.
Episodic task –
was the same
concept-feature
pair presented
before?
Congruency
(featureconcept)
matching task semantic, free
association
task – blend,
cued recall task
- episodic
Studying a list
of words
(encoding)
followed by a
recognition
task

Jensen &
Tesche, 2002

Sternberg
memory task

Jensen,
Gelfand,
Kounios, &
Lisman, 2002

Sternberg
memory task

Increase during
the feature
word
presentation in
the episodic
task

x

Increase during
the study
phase to the
words that will
be later
remembered,
increase during
the recognition
phase to
correctly
recognized
targets (no
such increase
to distractors
and notremembered
targets)
Increase with
the number of
items to be
remembered
x

Decrease
during the
feature word
presentation
in the
semantic

x

x

Decrease in
upper alpha
during the
semantic task
(during the
presentation
of the second
word)

x

x

In the lower
alpha,
decrease in
response to
items that
later will be
correctly
remembered.
In the upper
alpha,
increase to
items that
later won’t be
correctly
remembered
(upper alpha
– semantics)

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Increase with
the number
of items
stored in
short-term
memory
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Study

Paradigm

Theta

Klimesch,
Doppelmayr,S
chwaiger,
Auinger, &
Winkler, 1999

Memory search
paradigm

x

Klimesch,
Doppelmayr,
Russegger, &
Pachinger,
1996

Implicit
memory
paradigm

Tuladhar,
Huurne,
Schoffelen,
Maris,
Oostenveld, &
Jensen, 2007
Waldhauser,
Johansson, &
Hanslmayr,
2012

Sternberg
memory task

Selective cuebased memory
retrieval

Increase during
the encoding of
those words
which could be
remembered in
the later recall
task

x

x

Alpha

Beta

Gamma

Increase in
upper alpha
band in the
highest
memory
demand
cognition

x

x

x

x

Increase with
memory load

x

x

Increase in
the
interference
condition

x

x

x
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APPENDIX B
Gamma power difference for the substantial vs minimal change contrast
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Figure B1. The dynamics of gamma (30-55 Hz) power changes. The color bars represent relative power
change compared to the baseline period spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the determiner onset.
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APPENDIX C
This appendix contains information about the preprocessing and analysis of filler
items, as well as brief discussion of the results.
Preprocessing
Filler sentences (N=160) were designed to (i) elicit transient lexical and referential
ambiguity effects and (ii) reduce predictability of the object in the second sentence (for
the rationale, see above). Each participant saw forty filler items which contained a lexically
ambiguous word in the second sentence and forty control sentences (e.g. The woman
will wash the floor. And then, she will unroll the runner/carpet), as well as forty filler items
that contained a referentially ambiguous pronoun and forty control sentences
(John/Daphne valued Edward because he was very knowledgeable). Since we were
interested in the effects of lexical and referential ambiguity, our time-windows of interest
were time-locked to the ambiguous nouns and pronouns and their controls.
We redefined filler trials to include 850 msec before and 1260 msec after the
noun/pronoun onset which would allow us to look at the power spectrum associated with
the critical words in the time-window of 600 msec before and 1000 msec after the critical
word (given the parameters of the time-frequency analysis). After removing the linear
trend from the trials and running automatic artifact rejection, we eliminated participants
(N=9) who had more than 50% of trials with activity exceeding the +/-100 mV threshold.
Approximately 16% of trials were removed from the data of the 22 participants who
entered the final analysis.
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Time-frequency analysis and cluster-based random permutation test
Parameters for the time-frequency analysis and permutation test were identical to
those used for experimental items. The following comparisons were made:
•
•

Lexically ambiguous vs unambiguous (LexAmb)
Referentially ambiguous vs unambiguous (RefAmb)

Results
The cluster-based random permutation test didn’t reveal significant differences
between the lexically/referentially ambiguous and unambiguous items in any of the
frequency bands.
LexAmb
theta (4-7Hz)
alpha (8-12Hz)
beta (13-30Hz)

no clust
0.25 (pos)
0.56 (pos)

RefAmb
0.0-1000 msec
0.73 (neg)
0.91 (pos)
0.85 (pos)

Table C1. Results of the cluster-based random permutation tests for the lexically ambiguous vs
unambiguous and referentially ambiguous vs unambiguous contrasts, reported are the smallest p-values.

Figure C1. The dynamics of alpha (8-12 Hz) power changes. The color bars represent relative power
change compared to the baseline period spanning from -600 to -250 msec before the determiner onset.
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Discussion
We believe that we didn’t find significant effects in the analysis of lexically
ambiguous items because the contexts in which ambiguous words were used were
strongly biasing towards the intended meaning (thus all other meanings were highly
unlikely). The reason we didn’t find significant effects in the analysis of referentially
ambiguous items is similar: we chose verbs which had a strong bias either towards actor
(NP1) or patient (NP2) interpretation.
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